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Rebuilding Economic Foundations for a Stronger Future
Jack Reaney
…
“Sometimes, you need a good earthquake to show you
what’s earthquake-proof.”
––Anonymous
Earthquakes do more than just crumble
foundations. These disasters are a complete shake-up;
they exploit and emphasize the existing structural
weaknesses. Under the attentive spotlight which follows
those moments of great drama, they reveal the deeper
complications which might have otherwise appeared later
on. When architects, engineers, and city planners are
forced to face the destructive wakes of tremendous
quakes, they are better positioned to recognize and
address the rotten roots of the rubble. That same
disruption applies to the study of pandemics, famines,
and all other economic disasters. One fact perpetuates
those topics; even if a threat is “non-selective” by nature,
institutions, power figures, and social norms tend to
direct the worst impacts toward less-privileged groups,
who then suffer in higher proportion. Afterwards,
authorities can decide whether their society chooses to
address certain fundamental disparities. But in a
democratic society, at least, the scores of impact-analyses
should highlight the truth: like poorly-built homes that
crumble when shaken, disadvantaged groups will
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somehow be affected by disasters in different, unfair
ways. The COVID-19 pandemic is a modern reminder
that when populations throughout history are struck by
disaster like the infamous Black Death, the ensuing
research might reveal underlying trends of economic
inequality and demographic inequity, which could serve
as an impetus for positive change and explain beneficial
disruptions to obsolete norms.
I will discuss three historical phenomena derived
from research of the Black Death: the advancement of
women in labor systems, the pattern of governing bodies
to protect elitist power, and the societal tendency to use
panic to target and scapegoat vulnerable groups. These
issues connect to COVID-19 because women were––
alongside every group except educated, white males––
particularly shocked by the social and economic chaos of
pandemic which suggests there is work yet to be done in
the name of equal opportunity. Furthermore, the existing
social safety net was not yet prepared to handle that
unequal distribution of hardship or mental health
challenges from isolation. Finally, I note that “Asian
hate” emerged as an alarming reminder that American
education and media is still failing to build a national
ideology based in truth and fact.
Before discussing these narratives, it’s important
to acknowledge that post-disaster research may not
always reveal systematic flaws related to class, race,
gender, etc. which are useful for societal growth. In the
case of Cholera, for example, the disease was nonselective––anyone exposed faced the same risk. It was
even less selective than most pathogens, because the
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cause of spreading was unknown and somewhat random.
Epidemiologist John Snow eventually confirmed his
suspicion that Cholera transmitted through the infection
of local water sources––water being an essential resource
for all socioeconomic classes, this disease did not select
the poor (Ambrus et. Al 482). Ironically, income-shocks
from the cholera outbreak created long-term problems;
the affected area suffered depressed rent-prices and
reinforced the condensation of urban poverty, as
struggling neighbors applied negative externalities to the
blocks as a whole and five percent of families plunged
into poverty (476). Cholera could be seen as a disaster
which created long-lasting problems rather than
illuminate existing ones.
Another important note is that these eye-opening
studies might not appear until long after all eyes have
closed in those affected historical populations. In the last
century, we have used more efficient analytical tools––
and researchers with unprecedented time and resources––
to learn more about historical disasters than the original
affected populations ever possibly could have due to
constraints of technology, communication, medical
science, and other developments. Conclusions from
recent studies of the Black Death, for example, might
have been useful in the 14th century, but they did not
exist; thus, they saved zero lives and enabled no
immediate ideas which could have informed economic
disruptions which followed. But with regards to current
and future disasters like COVID-19, we can expect a
furious hunt for near-instantaneous and equitable data
insights; we can expect unintended cross-sections of the
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socioeconomic playing field; we can expect that in a
functioning democratic society––and I hope we can
expect a functioning democratic society––access to
information mobilizes positive change.
The Black Death serves as an excellent example of
how an exogenous shock can disrupt institutional norms.
European labor systems dissolved, “fundamentally
[changing] the balance of power between men and
women and between generations” (De Moor 14). Jedwab,
Johnson, and Koyoma explain that aggregate demand
plummeted (10); “Crops went unharvested, and building
projects stopped” (8). (This sounds familiar to the age of
COVID-19 when industrial activity was halted to a point
where even the price of oil went negative.) Religious
institutions became increasingly top-heavy, as struggling
low-class worshippers banded into movements of reform.
Unorthodox groups that sparked during the Black Death
wrote an important prologue to the Protestant
Reformation, a crucial historical pivot which swept
through Europe in the 1500s, challenging Roman
Catholicism (Jedwab et. al 39). Economies and religious
institutions were disrupted, and modern studies show that
those decaying landscapes were conducive to change.
For example, the European world may have been
ready to redefine gender roles and expectations.
Researchers disagree on whether the European Marriage
Pattern (EMP) emerged from, or was reinforced by, the
Black Death. But both views overwhelmingly argue that
the Black Death conducted the rise of the EMP in the 15th
century, which destabilized traditions of a male-focused
economy and early marriage for women. Female
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populations gained bargaining power, according to De
Moor and Van Zanden. Female presence in the workforce
rose as well as their average wage (14). Women finally
controlled significant wealth, saving to support future
families rather than being attached to their estate and
marrying according to their inherent value, before
immediately accepting the arduous cycle of fertility (15).
Perhaps to fill vacancies in decimated urban populations,
young men and women began engaging in labor
migration which also delayed marriages (15). These
socioeconomic shifts paralleled changes in the
agricultural standard; Nico Voigtländer and HansJoachim argue that especially in Northwest Europe,
production shifted “from corn to horn” as a Malthusian
rise in living standard enabled wider demand for animal
products which had been considered luxury goods before
the Black Death (Voigtländer 2254). All of these changes
happened fast in pre-industrial terms, building a stronger,
earthquake-proof foundation and re-wiring the path of
least resistance which helped conduct the Great
Divergence.
It must be noted that the Great Divergence is
remembered as a period of vast growth and progress,
when Western Europe adopted new cultural philosophies
and economic practices (such as the EMP and pastoral
farming). Some regions of Eastern and Southern Europe
lagged behind and “missed out” on the fruits of this
progress; the integration of women into positions of
relative power allowed for a more efficient division of
labor, in purely economic terms, and likely increased
societal enlightenment and morale. The Great Divergence
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is valuable evidence on a global scale, useful for femalelabor advocacy groups to undermine the arguments of
opponents with male-centric views, as they may have
never learned that progress for women has been an
ongoing battle since their initial empowerment helped
bring an end of the dark ages. Of course, gender
inequality still persists into the twenty-first century.
When COVID-19 struck the United States, the
path of least resistance was wired delicately between
competing political ideologies of how to support
struggling citizens when their jobs and businesses are
forced to shut down––in this case for unpredictable,
drastic reasons. In one pandemic-inspired profile of
American needs, Stefania Albanesi and Jiyeon Kim
showed that women are more-likely to work in service
providing industries––which suffered more than, say,
male-dominated finance and law––and that they,
especially, suffered a regression to old-fashioned norms
of tending to childcare and other household needs as
schools and daycare facilities closed (8). These gendered
responsibilities came at the expense of wage-earning,
career-advancing labor. That’s just one demographic
angle into the impact of crisis; of the massive overall
14.1% increase in unemployed––including employedbut-non-earning––Americans by April 2020, citizens
without a college education were more than twice as
likely to become unemployed (Bitler et. al 4). Food
security needs tripled, and food pantries reported a 70%
increase in demand (Bitler et. al 1). These needs
emphatically affected certain vulnerable groups,
overwhelming the programs and outlets which already
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supported them. Data from the rubble of this economic
shake-down emphasized the need for a stronger “Social
Safety Net”.
Mental health and wellness also became a priority.
Logel, Oreopoulos, and Petronijevic highlight the
increased challenges faced by students during the
pandemic, including increased rates of anxiety and
depression, and struggles with motivation and career
outlook. The authors argue that while these results appear
grim, they also might inform priorities tomorrow.
Unprecedented focus on coping strategies revealed “the
importance of focusing on social connection and social
support during times of stress and suggests that colleges
may support students’ well-being by providing
opportunities for them to connect with each other,” and
to prioritize communication in general (20). While
COVID-19 has been an unfortunate event for many
obvious reasons, it has highlighted some previously
camouflaged issues such as mental health issues which
might improve with greater focus on communication,
social connection, and support.
The authors also argue that as a backup for inperson networks of support, social media can deepen
existing relationships, as “people are less self-conscious
when communicating electronically, and therefore share
more of their joys, worries, and stresses. Such selfdisclosure is associated with positive relationship
outcomes” (22). While people struggled to adjust to
virtual connection during COVID-19 lockdowns, the
authors believe that the world’s expanded perception of
communication will be seen as a positive outcome of
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disruption, as populations are better prepared to use
technology as a tool to increase access to support. This
study on college students provides evidence for one
angle, but with caution, it could be fair to extrapolate that
American citizens should be better prepared to
communicate mental health needs support their peers
who might be struggling.
Apparently lacking mental health support, though,
America’s social safety net “has always been less farreaching and less funded compared to other rich
countries,” according to Marianne Bitler, Hilary W.
Hoynes, and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach (2). This
emergency relief system was built on programs including
Unemployment Insurance (UI) offering weekly payments
to jobless Americans, and Supplemental Nutritional
Assistance Program (SNAP) which is the current form of
the Food Stamp Program. With record-high UI
applications (34 million by July), congressional policy
added $600 per week of benefits ($23 billion per week in
federal spending) and opened eligibility to fit the
contemporary gig-economy (9-10). With unusual food
support needs, SNAP spending “more than doubled by
the end of July,” costing $1 billion more per week than
before the pandemic (9). Those financial resources were
not distributed with optimal attention to supporting
disparities of greatest importance; despite these massive,
hastily-legalized, expensive federal benefits, measures of
wellbeing still “are generally worse for families with
children, and for Black and Hispanic respondents” (11).
It’s possible that with all the current academic literature
which shows the porosity of America’s social safety net,
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the delicate wiring of crucial support might be replaced,
and the new circuitry will be more efficient than politics
could have spliced without a disaster like COVID-19 to
prove the need for reinforcement.
The Black Death, of course, also saw an initial
crumble before any aging buildings were restored. Before
the shock which killed 33-50% of Europe, normal
agrarian farming meant an economy based in the supply
and demand for grains and corn; after the plague’s deep
disruption to labor markets, populations, and standard of
living, women stepped up to assume greater value from
their roles as valuable pastoral farmers and relatively
independent citizens (Voigtländer 2258). Northwestern
Europe’s labor force––women, in particular––was
primed to make this adjustment in farming, but marginal
cost of change would have been prohibitive before a
Malthusian shock (the plague) transformed the market.
Through modern study, we can derive an understanding
that without the Black Death, women would have waited
longer for their renaissance of individual bargaining
power.
It’s also key to look for patterns in how institutions
will react to disruption, and the Black Death provides a
strong case. In the long run, wealth distribution in Europe
changed most notably by decreasing the relative wealth
share of the richest 10%; the top 10% went from
controlling 65-70% of wealth to just 50%, a drop which
compares to the 30% drop (from 90% to 60%) between
World Wars and including the Great Depression (De
Moor 19). This sudden parity of class in the 14th century
was unpleasant for elites; scrambling to grab their
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scattered power, they leveraged sumptuary laws which
dictated fashion based on social status (20-21). Power
figures using law to maintain the status quo is not an
archaic issue; in the current era of social justice in
America, partly tied to the COVID-19 pandemic,
America’s former president emphasized the importance
of “law and order” against activists protesting systemic
racism. He directly encouraged a white-supremacist
group to “stand back and stand by” during a presidential
debate (Frenkel). The Black Death is essential to
understanding how governing powers might hire
unequitable architects, attempting to suppress the
organization and growth of lower-class citizens in the
wake of disasters which destabilize institutions and
require plans to rebuild.
Furthermore, modern research into Jewish
pogroms during the Black Death can help explain the
factors which predict persecution in any era. One specific
study claimed that the behavior seen during the Black
Death paralleled subsequent treatment of Jews
throughout history, perhaps even the holocaust,
according to Jedwab, Johnson, and Koyoma, because
massive shocks such as plague and war happened to
coincide with “the worst episodes of anti-Semitic
violence” (347). By studying this angle of the Black
Death, societies today can provide shelter against
aftershocks––hate crimes against religious, racial, ethnic,
and social groups.
In the Black Death, these authors found the
important causal factors of persecution to be local
mortality rate, local involvement of Jews in the
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marketplace, and the propensity of a community to
scapegoat the Jewish community––blaming them for the
plague. Higher mortality rates discouraged pogroms or
persecutions, possibly because organizing costs and
efforts were too heavy for a weakened community (375).
But also, the marginal value of Jewish workers in the
moneylending sector was enhanced in desperate times of
high mortality, which financially deterred their exile or
extermination on an individual and community level
(376). Markets either silenced or fueled the anti-Semitic
behavior of certain communities.
Another interesting factor is that violent behavior
aimed at Jews followed the Christian calendar; near
Christmas, Jews were more commonly blamed for killing
Jesus, where closer to Easter, Christians were more
forgiving of Jews, and compelled to avoid sin including
spontaneous attacks on their neighborhoods (347). As
cold as it sounds, the authors concluded that in times of
disaster, persecution “depends on how the magnitude of
the shock interacts with the utility one derives from
persecution and the economic benefits associated with
the presence of the minority,” and that underlying biases
may sprout into violence during stressful times (391).
Using mortality and population data from the coincident
tragedies of Jewish pogrom during a plague, these
researchers bring important ideas to the surface which
can apply to any disaster where scapegoating is a risk.
The COVID-19 pandemic revealed scapegoating
risk, particularly to Asian and Jewish populations.
Inextricably tied to President Trump’s use of anti-China
“trade war” language, some Americans saw COVID-19
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as a canvas for the painting of China-centric xenophobia;
using terms like “Plandemic”, “Kung Flu Virus”,
“Chinese Flu”, and “Wuhan Virus”, white-supremacist
groups connected and thrived especially on right-wing,
unregulated social media platforms by “linking the
coronavirus to racist and antisemitic slurs and memes.
Users across these channels regularly share racist
messages or caricatures of Chinese people, mocking their
eating habits, accents, and hygiene” (Greenblatt 212). As
history shows, imagery of the Jewish community is
routinely toppled by wave after wave in the tide of antiSemitism. But this notion of Chinese inferiority is not
new, notably dated by the “Chinese Exclusion Act” of
1882, which resulted from public discourse of a “Yellow
Peril” (212). Already resurfacing before the virus partly
due to President Trump’s rhetoric of ‘reclaiming our
economy back from China’, COVID-19 provided a
perfect coincident justification for extreme corners of
America to identify themselves with racist language and
actions. Educators will take note, and this hopefully
supports awareness in the next generation.
The COVID-19 pandemic shook the world. Only
well-supported, well-informed constructs could withstand
the sudden destruction. However, earthquakes shake
from the ground; the worst impacts were felt by those
already weighed down by socioeconomic gravity, those
who the world always crashes down onto. But this
disaster, like all others, called for widespread research
and truth-seeking. While nobody wishes for tragedy, at
least the overflow of data can help us better recognize
our economic institutions, and our treatment of
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disadvantaged groups. Drawing on the long-term impacts
resulting from past “earthquakes” like the Black Death,
there is reason to hope the world might rebuild with
better attention to sustainable architecture. Perhaps, like
the Renaissance and waves of industrial revolution, the
world could emerge from some sort of “modern middle
age”, which will be remembered for inefficient norms of
economy and support, for class inequality sustained by
the manipulation of power, and for senseless hate
surviving through nostalgia and biases against minority
groups perpetuated through institutionalized ignorance
and an unethical media landscape which earns profit
through engagement with information, regardless of fact.
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